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PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF 
AIDS BY RESTRICTING SEXUAL 
CONDUCT IN GAY BATHHOUSES: 
A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the late Spring of 1981, the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) in Atlanta received reports of clusters of two rare dis-
eases, Kaposi's sarcoma (KS) and Pneumocistis carinii pneumo-
nia (PCP).l All the cases reported to the CDC were linked by a 
characteristic immunodeficiency.2 These were the first reported 
cases of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, commonly 
called "AIDS." 
AIDS is a deadly diseases with no known cause or cure." It 
can only be characterized by its expression, diseases which have 
as their necessary precondition an underlying immunodeficiency 
which cannot otherwise be explained. Ii 
1. Selik. Haverkos and Curran. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). 
Trends in the U.S., 1978-1982, 76 AM. J. MED. 394 (1984). The first cases reported were 
of PCP in four homosexual men in Los Angeles. Shortly thereafter, 26 cases of KS were 
reported from New York. San Francisco. and Los Angeles. 
2. Id. Immunodeficiency is a deficiency in the body's immune system. 
3. Forty per cent of those stricken with the disease have died. Landesman and 
Vieira. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS): A Review. 143 ARCH. INTERNAL 
MED. 2307 (1983). Because the number of cases reported per quarter year increases. 
Selik, Haverkos. and Curran. supra. note 1. at 495, and the length of time from diagnosis 
to death is anywhere from days to years. the mortality rate for those diagnosed in previ-
ous years is higher. The two year mortality rate (those who have been diagnosed for two 
or more years) is in excess of 70%, Landesman and Vieira. supra. at 2307. "However. 
when one breaks down the mortality rate according to the year of diagnosis. the ultimate 
mortality may well approach 100%," Fauci. Macher. Longo. Lane. Rook. Masur and 
Gelman. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome; Epidemiologic. Clinical. Immunologic 
and Therapeutic Considerations. 100 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 92. 94 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Fauci.), 
4. "The etiology of' AIDS is unknown." Landesman and Vieira, supra note 3. at 
2307. Treatment is limited to the diseases which arise out of the immunodepression. but 
not the basic immune defect. Id. at 2308. 
5. "The CDC defines a case of AIDS as a patient with a reliably diagnosed disease 
that is at least moderately indicative of an underlying cellular immunodeficiency when 
no known cause or reduced resistence to that disease is present." Selik, Haverkos. and 
Curran. supra note 1. at 493. Typical of the diseases indicative of AIDS are 
301 
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No patient has successfully regained immunocompetence 
(been cured) through treatment.s Therefore treatment has been 
mainly supportive, directed at controling the secondary infec-
tions and malignancies. 7 
The geographical, social and ethnic clustering of cases sug-
gests that AIDS is caused by a transmissible agent, most likely a 
virus.8 It is generally believed that the viral agent suppresses the 
Cryptosporidiosis: an intestinal infection causing diarrhea for more than one month; 
Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia; strongyloidosis: causing pneumonia or central nervous 
system infection; Toxoplasmosis: causing pneumonia or central nervous system infection; 
Candidiasis: causing esophagitis (infiamation of the esophagus); Cryptococcosis: causing 
central nervous system or disseminated (scattered) infection; "atypical" mycobacteriosis: 
causing disseminated infection; cytomegolovirus: causing pulmonary, gastrointestinal 
tract, or central nervous system infection; herpes simplex virus: causing chronic infection 
on the skin or mucous membrane with ulcers persisting for more than one month, or 
pulmonary, gastrointestinal tract or disseminated infection; progressive multifocal 
leukoencephalopathy: a fatal disease destroying the cerebral hemispheres of the brain; 
Kaposi's Sarcoma: a rare form of malignant skin cancer; and lyphoma limited to the 
brain: an unusual anatomic localization for cancer of the lymph nodes. Id. at 499. 
6. Landesman and Vieira, supra note 3, at 2307. 
7. Fauci, supra note 3, at 101. 
8. In patients with AIDS the T-cells (a type of white blood cell) of the lymph sys-
tem are reduced in number and function. These T-cells protect the body against infec-
tion from viruses, protozoa, fungi, and microbial agents. When T-cell dysfunction occurs 
due to AIDS, the body succumbs to these infectious agents. Ammann, Dristy, Volberd-
ing, et al., The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (A1DS)-A Multidiciplinary 
Enigma, 140 W.J. MED. 66-67 (1984). Three viruses (or possibly variants of the same 
virus) have been identified as candidate AIDS agents. Human T-cell Leukemia virus 
Type III (HTLV-III) was isolated from the T-lymphocytes of AIDS patients by Dr. Gallo 
of the National Institute of Health. Types I and II have been found to cause immune 
impairment and a rare T-cell leukemia. Dr. Montagnier, at the Pasteur Institute in 
France, has isolated a virus from the lymphocytes of a patient with lymphadenopathy 
(sometimes referred to as "pre-AIDS"). This virus appears to be different than the one 
isolated by Gallo. Fauci, supra note 3, at 104. Dr. Jay Levy has independently isolated a 
virus from the T -cells of a patient suffering from lymphadenopathy which he calls AIDS 
Related Virus (ARV). S.F. Chron., Aug. 17, 1984, at 4, col. 1; Bay Area Reporter, Aug. 16, 
1984, at 1, col. 3. 
Lymphadenopathy ("pre-AIDS"), a disease of the lymph nodes, has been suggested 
as a prodrome (precursor) to classic AIDS. It has been defined by the CDC as a chronic, 
unexplained lymphadenopathy in gay men of at least 3 months duration involving 2 or 
more extrainguinal (outside the groin) sites absent any current illness or drug use known 
to cause lymphadenopathy; and the presence of reactive hyperplasia (abnormal increase 
in the number of cells in normal tissue) in a biopsy. CDC, Persistent, Generalized 
Lymphadenopathy Among Homosexual Males, 31 MORTALITY AND MORBIDITY WEEKLY 
REP. 249, 249 (1982). Although the relationship between lymphadenopathy in gay men 
and AIDS is unclear, its temporal relationship as a precursor and the substantial number 
of lymphadenopathy patients who eventually develop AIDS, suggests it is a prodrome of 
AIDS. 
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normal function of the body's immune system.9 
Since the first reported outbreak in 1981, AIDS has spread 
in epidemic fashion. As of November 9, 1984, the Centers for 
Disease Control has received reports of 6,931 cases in the United 
States.lo The disease has spread throughout the U.S. at a loga-
rithmic rate. 935 cases were reported in 1982, and 1,924 cases 
were reported in 1983. As of March, 1984, five new cases were 
being reported to the CDC each day.ll Presently the number of 
cases doubles every six months. 12 Of the cases reported, 70% are 
in homosexual and bisexual men, 18 % in intravenous drug users, 
4 % in Haitians, 1 % in hemophiliacs, and 7 % in other groups.18 
It is theorized that the causal agent of AIDS is transmitted 
via contact with the blood or mucus membranes of a carrier. I. 
Close mucosal contact allows the carrier's blood to come in con-
tact with the blood of the receiver, by which the agent is trans-
ferred. Such mucosal contact typically occurs during anal and 
oral sexual intercourse among homosexual males. This theory 
explains why homosexual males are in a high risk category. Di-
rect blood transfer may account for the prevalence of the disease 
among intravenous drug users/II and hemophiliacs.16 Present 
patterns of transmission suggest that AIDS will remain largely 
confined to the groups already affected.17 
9. Fauci, supra note 3, at 101. 
10. Telephone interview with Michael Serban, Associate, John Artman and Associ-
ates (Dec. 12, 1984) (public relations contractor with the City of San Francisco Public 
Health Department). 
11. Landesman and Vieira, supra note 3, at 2307. 
12. As of June, 1984, there were 4,761 cases of AIDS nationwide reported to the 
CDC. Flaherty, A Legal Emergency Brewing Over AIDS, 6 NAT'L L.J. 44 (July 9, 1984). 
13. Selik, Haverkos and Curran, supra note 1, at 499. Of the 7% reported in other 
groups, 0.9% of those persons had heterosexual intercourse with a person in one of the 
four principal risk groups, and 1.5% in persons who had received a blood transfusion 
within five years before the onset of AIDS. 
14. La Rocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697 (N.Y. 1983). (Testimony of Dr. Hanra-
han, internal medicine specialist and epidemiologist at CDC). There is no evidence that 
transmission by casual contact is possible. Fauci, supra note 3, at 93. 
15. Intravenous drug users presumably transmit the disease by use of contaminated 
needles. Landesman and Vieira, supra note 3, at 2307. 
16. Gottlieb, Schroff and Schanker, Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia and Mucosal 
Candidiasis in Previously Healthy Homosexual Men, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1430 (Dec. 
10, 1981); Seigal, Lopez and Hammer, Severe Acquired Immunodeficiency in Male 
Homosexuals Manifested by Chronic Perinatal Ulcerative Herpes simplex lesions, 305 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1439 (Dec. 10, 1981). 
17. Researchers expect only minor intrusions into other populations, possibly 
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It appears that more people have been exposed to the agent 
than have developed the syndrome. I8 Therefore, it is possible 
that a significant number of persons have developed immunity.I9 
The probability of a person in a high risk category con-
tracting AIDS is not known.20 The San Francisco Department of 
Public Health, in conjunction with the CDC, made a study of 
the risk factors for AIDS in a sample of 50 homosexual and bi-
sexual men with AIDS and 120 matched healthy homosexual 
controls.21 The study revealed that among the major risk factors 
in the cases was a history of multiple and repeated infections 
with classic and parasitic sexually-transmitted diseases, and a 
history of multiple and diverse sexual encounters.22 There was a 
significant preponderance of syphillis, non-B Hepatitis and 
acute amebiasis23 in the histories of those with AIDS. Among the 
most significant findings was the promiscuity of the stricken pa-
tients. While the control group averaged a mean of 25 different 
sexual partners in the year prior to the study, the men with 
AIDS averaged a mean of 65 different sexual partners in the 
year prior to their diagnosis as carriers. Fifty percent or more of 
their partners were encountered in the anonymous setting of gay 
bathhouses.24 
The rate of progression of the syndrome spans a broad con-
tinuum. At one extreme is a fulminating illness where the pa-
tient rapidly succumbs to opportunistic infection within hours or 
through a blood transfusion, Fauci, supra note 3, at 92; or sexual intercourse between 
gay or bisexual men and heterosexual women, S.F. Chron., Dec. 6, 1984, at I, col. 4. 
18. A 1984 study by Dr. Connant at the University of California in San Francisco 
found antibodies to AIDS Related Virus (ARV) in 64% of the gay men tested in a ran-
dom sample. See supra note 7. Antibodies were found in the blood of all the AIDS pa-
tients and 92% of their sexual partners. No antibodies were found in the blood of heter-
osexuals not in the other high risk categories. S. F. Chron., Aug. 17, 1984, at 4, col. 1. 
19. Fauci, supra note 3, at 94. 
20. Kalish, Goldsmith, Green, Hsu, and Phair, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syn-
drome in a Patient with Multiple Risk Factors, 143 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 2311 (Dec. 
1983). Neither is the probability of contracting AIDS known for persons with multiple 
risk factors. 
21. Jaffe, Choi, and Thomas et al., National Case Control Study of Kaposi's sar-
coma and Pneumocystis carinii in Homosexual Males, Part I and II, 99 ANNALS INTER-
NAL MED. 145 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Jaffe). 
22. Ammann, supra note 8, at 69 (citing Jaffe, supra note 21, at 149). 
23. Acute amebiasis is severe amoeLic infection, often of the intestine, forming 
ulcers. 
24. Jaffe, supra note 21, at 149. 
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days of the onset of the illness. At the other extreme, the patient 
may suffer from a prodrome such as lymphadenopathy,2Ii lasting 
weeks to months prior to the onset of classic AIDS. This form of 
"pre-AIDS" may result in fevers, substantial weight loss, mal-
aise, and diarrhea.26 Midrange in the spectrum are patients who 
develop lesions of KS or other malignant neoplasms,27 with the 
subsequent spread or complication of the malignancy by super-
imposed opportunistic infections. Most patients ultimately suc-
cumb to overwhelming infection.28 
Classic AIDS has a substantial debilitating effect on the pa-
tient. One man's experience is illustrative: 
For the first time in my life. . . I found my-
self bedridden with a cold that wouldn't go away, 
viral bronchitis, fever, diarrhea, loss of appetite, 
and extreme fatigue. These problems persisted for 
several months and were coupled with the discov-
ery of swollen lymph nodes .... Then I devel-
oped chronic ear infections, shingles on the backs 
of both legs and a persistent sore throat. The di-
arrhea continued and nausea became a fact of 
everyday life; eating became increasingly difficult 
- I began to lose weight. 
I was frightened and depressed by the fact 
that the illnesses were multiple, and that no 
sooner would one go away than something else 
would appear. I then began to experience with in-
creasing frequency the most alarming and intimi-
dating of all these maladies - night sweats. 
Sometimes I would wake up crying because I was 
so cold and frightened. No amount of preparation 
before bed could relieve the anxiety and fear. . . . 
I dreaded what I needed most - sleep. I didn't 
want to close my eyes.28 
25. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
26. Landesman and Vieira, supra note 3, at 2307. 
27. For definition of KS, see supra note 5; malignant neoplasm: a cancerous growth 
in tissue. 
28. Landesman and Vieira, supra note 3, at 2307. An autopsy report of 36 AIDS 
victims found that 83% of the deaths were immediately due to opportunistic infection. 
S. F. ehron., Sept. 7, 1984, at 22, col. 1. 
29. Morin and Batchelor, Responding to the Psychological Crisis of AIDS: A 
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The psychological impact on the patient is also profound. 
The majority of patients are young, previously healthy people in 
the prime of life. Upon diagnosis, they often go through a series 
of reactions, including a loss of self-esteem, fear of alienation by 
friends and lovers, fear of loss of physical attractiveness and 
change in body image, guilt about sexual or drug-related behav-
ior,30 fear of loss of control and dependency, loss of financial sta-
tus, and fear of social stigmatization and exposure of lifestyle. 
All this is compounded by the general fear of death and dyingY 
The AIDS epidemic has a deep psychological impact on the 
gay community as well. AIDS serves to magnify the pre-existing 
social antipathy towards gay and lesbian people.32 Psychologists 
Clinical Perspective, 99 PUB. HEALTH REP. 4, 4 (1984). 
Participation in treatment and medical research for a cure can be debilitating as 
well. Another patient's experience: 
Id. 
My treatment with Alpha Interferon (a type of soluable pro-
tein produced by cells invaded by a virus which induce non-
infected cells to produce antiviral proteins to inhibit viral 
growth) required ten days of injections, ten days of rest, and 
ten more daily injections. Within two hours of the first injec-
tion, I had severe chills, followed by high fever, and reversion 
back to chills. These side-effects subsided after a few days, but 
the most devastating were still to come. Over the 30-day 
course of treatment, I noticed myself becoming profoundly 
more fatigued and depressed. Where just before the course of 
Interferon I was still running four miles a day, there were days 
now that I barely wanted to get out of bed. 
30. For some patients, the guilt can result in a rejection of their gay sexual identity 
and a reaffirmation of any residual self-hatred manifest prior to the "coming out" pro-
cess. See infra notes 34 and 93. Forstein, The Psychological Impact of AIDS, 11 SEMI-
NARS IN ONCOLOGY 77, 78 (1984). 
31. Id. at 77. See Perry and Tross, Psychiatric Problems of AIDS Inpatients at the 
New York Hospital: Preliminary Report, 99 PUB. HEALTH REP. 200, 201 (1984). 
I In addition to these emotional reactions, the physical symptoms arising from AIDS 
can result in psychiatric complications. Fatigue and weight-loss associated with 
lymphadenopathy can lead to depression. Opportunistic infections which attack the cen-
tral nervous system (such as encephalitis and primary lymphoma, see supra note 5) 
often produce cognitive defects such as confusion, disorientation, loss of memory, mood 
disturbances, involuntary or uncontrolled movements, and impulsive behavior. Perry and 
Tross, supra, at 201, 203. 
32. Forstein, supra note 30, at 77. Discrimination in employment has resulted in the 
firing of gay employees because of fears that they may have AIDS. See Case v. County of 
Tulare, No. 111532 (Super. Ct. Tulare Co. Cal. filed 1983) (hairdresser fired for fear he 
had AIDS); Truman v. Camden, No. (Oakland Co. Cir., Mich. 1983) (insurance 
agent fired when employer learned he had AIDS). A suit being brought against Los An-
geles paramedics claiming that they delayed in treating the plaintiff because they feared 
(falsely) that he had AIDS. Bergman v. City of Los Angeles, No. C49773 (Los Angeles 
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have documented general anxiety among the "worried well," hy-
pochondriasis, and excessive preoccupation with bodily health as 
anxiety states associated with gay men at risk of AIDS.33 Al-
though no study has yet been done, researchers believe that the 
threat of AIDS inhibits the process of acceptance of one's homo-
sexual orientation, and exacerbates the difficulty of "coming 
out. "34 Sexual dysfunction from fear of spreading the disease can 
also be a problem.31i 
The impact of AIDS on the gay community is pervasive and 
the community is responding to the threat. Groups have been 
formed to combat the problem, including foundations devoted to 
funding research and health education,3S and counseling and 
support groups for the terminally ill.37 State and Federal govern-
ment has limited its role to medical research and treatment, and 
has, in general, not attempted to limit sexual transmission of the 
disease. 
The first effort to prohibit the transmission of the disease 
was made by the City of San Francisco, which has the highest 
per capita number of AIDS victims.3s On October 9, 1984, Dr. 
Mervin Silverman, then Director of the San Francisco Public 
Health Department, ordered the closing of 14 gay bathhouses 
and sex establishments which he alleged "promote the spread of 
AIDS."39 Within hours, six clubs reopened, challenging the or-
der, and the City filed briefs seeking a court order enjoining the 
businesses from operating.40 The Superior Court allowed the 
businesses to remain open, but enjoined certain practices and or-
Super. Ct. Cal. filed May 1984). A New York City doctor who treats AIDS patients suc-
cessfully defeated an eviction from his office by his neighbors who don't want AIDS pa-
tients coming into the building. People v. 49 West 12th Street, No. 43604-83 (App. Div., 
N.Y., filed 1983). Flaherty, A Legal Emergency Brewing over AIDS, 6 NAT'L L. J. 1, 44 
(July 9, 1984). 
33. Morin and Batchelor, supra note 29, at 7-8. 
34. Forstein, supra note 30, at 81. "Coming out" has been defined as the self-admis-
sion and acceptance of ones homosexuality and the communication to others of that fact. 
Coleman, Developmental Stages of the Coming Out Process, HOMOSEXUALITY 151 (1982). 
35. Forstein, supra note 30, at 81. 
36. San Francisco AIDS Foundation, San Francisco AIDS Fund. 
37. Shanti Project, Hospice. 
38. Eight hundred and twenty six people have been diagnosed in San Francisco. 
Telephone interview with Michael Serban, supra note 10. 
39. S.F. Chron., Oct. 10, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Bay Area Reporter, Oct. 11, 1984, at 1, col. 
1. 
40. S.F. Chron., supra note 39, at 18; Bay Area Reporter, supra note 39, at 1. 
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dered the businesses to hire employees to enforce compliance 
with the injunction.41 The legal battle will test the state's au-
thority to limit gay sexual behavior for the avowed purpose of 
preventing the spread of AIDS. 
This analysis of the state's authority to limit sexual behav-
ior in gay bathhouses will begin by examining the precedents in-
volving the use of quarantine and nuisance statutes to control 
the spread of communicable diseases. A discussion of common 
law limitations on the use of those statutes will follow. The con-
stitutional analysis begins with the right to privacy embodied in 
the United States and California Constitutions, and its relation-
ship to gay sexual intimacy generally. The application of ra-
tional basis and strict scrutiny standards will be analyzed and 
arguments presented in favor of applying strict scrutiny. The 
state's compelling interest in stopping the spread of AIDS will 
be analyzed under strict scrutiny with appropriate attention to 
achieving the state's interest without broadly infringing on the 
individual's privacy. Discussion of enforcement of a limitation 
on bathhouse sexual activity and the fourth amendment issues it 
raises will conclude the Comment. 
II. STATE'S INTEREST IN PROTECTING PUBLIC 
HEALTH 
Protecting health and safety has long been recognized as a 
legitimate exercise of the state's police power.'2 The state's po-
lice power is vested entirely in the legislature,43 and it alone can 
41. S.F. Chron., Nov. 29, 1984, at I, col. 5. The order specifically restrains the busi-
ness from operating private rooms on the premises; orders the hiring of one employee for 
every 20 patrons to survey the entire premises every 20 minutes and expel all patrons 
engaging in high risk sexual activity as defined by the San Francisco AIDS Foundation; 
the removal of doors to individual rooms and cubicles; and education of patrons toward 
the prevention of high risk sexual activity. San Francisco v. Owen, No. 830-321 (Cal. 
Super. Ct., Nov. 28, 1984) (order granting preliminary injunction). 
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973), Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977). 
43. DeAryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674, 681, 260 P.2d 98, 101-02 (1953). 
The Legislature is possessed of the entire police power of the 
state, except as its power is limited by the provisions of the 
Constitution and other laws applicable thereto. Such police 
power is an indispensable per<lgative of the sovereignty and 
may not be legally limited ... so long as it is not unreasona-
ble and arbitrarily invoked and applied (emphasis in the 
original). 
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delegate enforcement authority.44 Health and safety legislation 
is given broad and liberal construction by courts,411 and it is only 
limited by provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions.48 
The state's interest in protecting the health of its people is 
strengthened as the particular threat to health becomes 
greater.47 The stronger the state interest in protecting against a 
threat to health and safety, the broader construction given to 
the statute addressing that threat. 
In the area of communicable diseases, the state has tradi-
tionally asserted its police power through quarantine isolation,48 
Id. See Justesen's Food Stores, Inc. v. City of Tulare, 12 Cal. 2d 324, 329, 84 P.2d 140, 
143 (1938); Boyd v. City of Sierra Madre, 41 Cal. App. 520, 523, 183 P. 230, 232 (1919); 
Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 490, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925). "It is also 
competent for the Legislature, within the Constitutional limits of its powers, to declare 
any act criminal and make the repetition or continuance thereof a public nuisance ... 
but it is not the province of the courts to ordain such jurisdiction for themselves." Peo-
ple v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 879, 118 P.2d 472, 476 (1941) (quoting State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. 
Va. 700, 64 S.E. 935, 940 (1909)). 
44. It is within the authority of the City of San Francisco to adopt regulations to 
promote health and safety, such as quarantine. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 6, 11. DeAryan, 
119 Cal. App. 2d at 681, 260 P.2d at 101-02. 
45. In re Halko, 246 Cal. App. 2d 553, 557, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661, 663 (1966); In re 
Johnson, 40 Cal. App. 242, 244, 180 P. 644-45 (1919); People v. Johnson, 129 Cal. App. 
2d I, 7-8, 277 P.2d 45, 50 (1954). 
46. DeAryan, 119 Cal. App. 2d at 681, 260 P.2d at 101. 
47. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 130, 150 (1973). The higher mortality rate among women 
receiving illegal abortions and abortions in the second and third trimester of pregnancy 
was a basis to assert a greater state interest in regulating conditions under which abor-
tions are performed. Because the state's interest was stronger over more dangerous abor-
tions late in pregnancy, Roe allowed states to ban abortions in the third trimester while 
forbidding the banning of them in the first and second. 
48. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 3000-3125 (Deering 1981). CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 
17, R 2520 (1981) defines quarantine as: 
[t)he limitation of freedom of movement of persons or animals 
that have been exposed to a communicable disease for a pe-
riod of time equal to the longest usual incubation period of the 
disease, in such a manner as to prevent effective contact with 
those not exposed. If the disease is one requiring quarantine of 
the contacts in addition to isolation of the case, the local 
health officer shall determine the contacts who are subject to 
quarantine, specify the place to which they shall be quaran-
tined, and issue instructions accordingly. 
Isolation is defined as "separation of infected persons from other persons, for the 
period of communicability in such places and under such conditions as will prevent the 
transmission of the infectious agent." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, R 2515 (1981). 
Modified isolation shall be prescribed by the local health officer when only modified 
isolation is required. The technique of isolation shall depend on the disease. 17 CAL. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, R 2518 (1981). 
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and nuisance abatement.49 Government officials are likely, there-
fore, to consider traditional quarantine, isolation, and nuisance 
The State Department of Health may "quarantine, isolate, inspect, and disinfect 
persons animals, houses, rooms, other property, places, cities or localities, whenever in its 
judgment such action is necessary to protect or preserve the public health." CAL. HEALTH 
& SAFETY CODE § 3051 (Deering 1981). The State Department may "establish and main-
tain places of quarantine and isolation," § 3112, "adopt and enforce rules and regulations 
requiring isolation ... or quarantine for any of the contagious, infectious or communica-
ble diseases if in the opinion of the state department such action is necessary . . . ," § 
3123, take any measures necessary to "ascertain the nature of the disease and prevent its 
spread," § 3053, and "take possession or control of the body of a living person," § 3053. 
The California Administrative Code gives local health officials the authority to examine 
and diagnose the infected person, investigate and determine the source of the infection, 
and "take appropriate steps to prevent or control the spread of the disease," 17 CAL. 
ADMIN. CODE tit. 17, R 2512 (1981). All persons have a duty to obey any health officer's 
isolation orders, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3116 (Deering 1981) and anyone who 
opposes or neglects the orders of a health official rejecting quarantine or isolation is 
guilty of a misdemeanor, and subject to a fine of $50.00 to $1,000 or up to 90 days in jail 
or both. §§ 3350, 3354. 
49. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479-3499 (Deering 1984). Nuisance, is defined as: 
[a]nything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offen-
sive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of prop-
erty, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life 
or property, or unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in 
the customary manner, of any navigable lake or river, bay, 
stream, canal or basin, or any public park, square, street or 
highway is a nuisance. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479. 
"A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or 
neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoy-
ance or damage inflicted upon the individual may be unequal." CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480. 
"Every nuisance not included in the definition of [§ 3480] is private." CAL. CIV. CODE § 
3481. 
"A public nuisance may be abated by any public body or officer authorized thereto 
by law." CAL. CIV. CODE §3494. The remedies against a public nuisance are (1) criminal 
indictment or information, (2) civil action, or (3) abatement. CAL. CIV. CODE §3491. 
The common law definition of a public nuisance includes "activity which endangers 
the health or safety or property of a considerable number of persons, offends public 
morals, or interferes with the comfort or convenience of a considerable number of peo-
ple." O. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM, J. JULIN AND A. SMITH, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 116 (3d 
ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as BASIC PROPERTY LAW]. Public nuisances regarding inter-
ferences with public health have been found in cases concerning a hogpen, keeping dis-
eased animals, and a malarial pond. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS 
643-44 (5th ed. 1984). 
"To be considered public, the nuisance must affect an interest common to the gen-
eral public, rather than peculiar to one individual, or several .... It is not necessary, 
however, that the entire community be affected, so long as the nuisance will interfere 
with those who come in contact with it in the exercise of a public right." PROSSER AND 
KEETON, supra at 645. "Most nuisance cases involve recurrent activity rather than an 
isolated wrongful act." BASIC PROPERTY LAW, supra at 117. Therefore, some courts re-
quire that the activity continue or recur over a period of time to be a nuisance. [d. 
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statutes as a means to control the spread of AIDS,lio Constitu-
tional challenges to quarantine and isolation statutes have been 
denied by courts citing the broad discretion given to legislative 
enactments promoting health and safety,lil These California 
quarantine cases were decided prior to 1950, and therefore did 
not address these statutes in light of modern constitutional de-
velopments in privacy, due process, equal protection and search 
and seizure, (Later sections will discuss these doctrines as they 
concern the conflicting interests of the AIDS carriers and the 
state),1i2 The quarantine cases fashioned a "reasonable cause" 
limitation on the police powers of the state to quarantine and 
isolate,li3 
Reasonable cause in the public health context requires that 
health officials have reasonable grounds to believe that a person 
is afflicted with a communicable disease before they can examine 
or isolate the person,li4 A mere suspicion, unsupported by facts 
giving rise to probable cause, is not enough to justify placing a 
person under quarantine, "It will not do to allow the inference of 
50. Since AIDS has been shown to be transmitted among homosexual and bisexual 
men via close mucosal contact during sexual intercourse, and not by casual contact, 
supra note 14 and accompanying text, it is most likely that modified isolation of AIDS 
carriers would be ordered before quarantine or full isolation. Such modified isolation has 
been proposed in a memorandum by James Chin, M.D., Chief of Infectious Diseases 
Section, California Department of Health Services, Proposed Public Health Action in 
Response to a Documented Recalcitrant AIDS Patient. (Dec. I, 1983). 
San Francisco v. Owen, No. 830-321 (Super. Ct. S.F. Cal. filed Oct. 18, 1984) (City 
attorneys sought an injunction on the theory that the 14 bathhouses and sex establish-
ments ordered closed were a public nuisance). 
51. In re Halko, 246 Cal. App. 2d at 557,54 Cal. Rptr. at 663; In re Johnson, 40 Cal. 
App. at 244, 180 P. at 664-45; In re Culver, 187 Cal. 437, 440, 202 P. 661, 663 (1921). 
[Bly virtue of the broad power conferred by §§ 2979 and 
2979(a) of the Political Code ... the State Board of Health 
has power to order the quarantine of persons who have come 
in contact with cases and carriers of contagious diseases when 
the Board shall deem it necessary to preserve the public 
health. 
Id.; DeAryan, 119 Cal. App. 2d at 682, 260 P.2d at 102. "The determination by the legis-
lative body that a particular regulation is necessary for the protection or preservation of 
health is conclusive on the courts except only to the limitation that it must be a reasona-
ble determination ... and must not infringe upon the rights secured by the Constitu-
tion." Id. 
52. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
53. See In re Milstead, 44 Cal. App. 239, 244, 186 P. 170, 172 (1919); In re Halko, 
256 Cal. App. 2d at 553, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 644; DeAryan v. Butler, 119 Cal. App. 2d 674, 
682, 260 P.2d at 102; In re Shepard, 51 Cal. App. 49, 51, 195 P. 1077, 1077 (1921). 
54. In re Milstead, 44 Cal. App. at 244, 186 P. at 172. 
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probable cause to be drawn from a mere suspicion. "1111 Although 
the cases have more or less loosely used "reasonable cause" in-
terchangably with "probable cause,"IIS the level of cause required 
to be shown by the state was not synonymous with the more 
probable than not standard in the criminal setting. Quarantine 
orders were issued to hold suspected prostitutes in custody until 
trial on the supposition that their release would allow them to 
spread venereal disease. 1I7 The courts required only that the 
state make a showing that the woman be of a class of persons 
(prostitutes) likely to have venereal disease in order to establish 
reasonable cause that the woman had venereal disease. liS A 
showing that it was more probable than not that the individual 
prostitute had venereal disease was not required. 
Underlying the reasonableness requirement of these cases is 
the use of quarantine statutes to restrain a criminal class of per-
sons where the state viewed the usual criminal law processes as 
inadequate. These cases are distinguishable in application to the 
bathhouse setting because gay men are not a criminal class. liS In 
determining the reasonableness requirement, courts should bal-
ance the need to quarantine in terms of the likelihood of reduc-
ing the spread of the disease against the invasion of liberty 
which would result.so Therefore, the first step in the inquiry is to 
determine the likelihood that bathhouse sexual conduct results 
in the transmission of AIDS. The extent of the invasion of a pro-
tected liberty interest is discussed below.S) 
Whether it is likely that a bathhouse patron will have sex 
with an AIDS carrier is a question of fact to be determined by 
medical testimony and research. The latest studies show a 
strong correlation between the number of sexual partners and 
55. In re Arata, 52 Cal. App. 380, 384, 198 P. 814, 816 (1921). See also In re Shep-
ard, 51 Cal. App. at 51, 195 P. at 1077. 
56. In re Arata, 52 Cal. App. at 383, 198 P. at 816 ("reasonable or probable"); In re 
Shepard, 51 Cal. App. at 51, 195 P. at 1077 (case dismissed because facts did not estab-
lish even a "well-defined suspicion."). 
57. See In re Arata 52 Cal. App. 380, 198 P. 814; In re Shepard, 51 Cal. App. 49, 
195 P. 1077. 
58. In re Arata, 52 Cal. App. at 383-84, 198 P. at 814; In re Shepard, 51 Cal. App. at 
51, 195 P. at 1077. 
59. Homosexual conduct is no longer a criminal act in California. 
60. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-37 (1967). 
61. See infra notes 73-116 and accompanying text. 
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the likelihood of contracting AIDS.62 The Jaffe study found the 
frequency of intercourse was significantly correlated with ten 
other variables, including meeting partners in bathhouses, a his-
tory of syphillis and other sexually transmitted diseases, and the 
use of street drugs and nitrite inhalants.63 Friedman-Kien at-
tempts to explain a similar finding by associating numerous sex 
partners, use of bathhouses, sexually transmitted diseases, and 
drug usage with the development of a gay culture in the urban 
environment.64 The not-yet-completed Darrow study, nowever, 
is said to show no significant correlation between bathhouse sex 
and the spread of AIDS.65 
Although it seems clear that the frequency of sexual activity 
with different partners increases the probability of contracting 
AIDS, it is not demonstrable that the bathhouse environment 
itself adds significantly to the risks of contagion. At best, there 
is a correlation which is not yet fully understood or proven. The 
state would have to make a showing that restricting sexual con-
duct in bathhouses would be likely to reduce the spread of AIDS 
in order to satisfy the threshold reasonable cause requirement of 
the quarantine cases. . 
If a correlation is found between bathhouse sex and the 
spread of AIDS, nuisance law would support closure only if more 
narrow means of "abating" the problem do not exist.66 
Where the decree absolutely prohibits any acts, 
there should be abundant evidence that the con-
tinuance of the acts will inevitably result in irrep-
arable injury. In the absence of such strong evi-
dence, the decree should merely enjoin the doing 
of the particular acts in a manner calculated to 
62. See Jaffe, supra note 21, at 147, 149; Friedman-Kien, Laubenstein, Rubenstein 
and Boimovici-Klein, Disseminated Kaposi's sarcoma in Homosexual Men, 96 ANNALS 
OF INTERNAL MED. 693, 697 (1982); Marmor, Laubenstein and Friedman-Kien, Risk Fac-
tors for Kaposi's sarcoma in Homosexual Men, LANCET 1083, 1085 (1982); A new study 
underway by Darrow of the CDC has also been reported to show a correlation with sex-
ual promiscuity. Bay Area Reporter, Oct. 11, 1984, at 1, col. 1. 
63. Jaffe, supra note 21, at 147. 
64. Friedman Kien, Laubenstein, Rubenstein, and Boimovici-Klien, supra note 62, 
at 697. 
65. Bay Area Reporter, Oct. 11, 1984, at 1, col. 1. 
66. Anderson v. Souza, 38 Cal. 2d 825, 843-44, 243 P.2d 497, 509 (1952); Morton v. 
Superior Court. 124 Cal. App. 2d 577. 582. 269 P.2d 81. 84 (1954). 
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injure the plaintiff.67 
Injunctions to abate a public nuisance where the business is not 
per se unlawful88 should be limited in scope to just afford the 
state relief from the potential spread of AIDS.89 Bathhouses are 
not a nuisance per se because their operation is not in violation 
of any state statute.70 Therefore, a court injunction restricting 
their operation can only be as broad as necessary to stop the 
spread of the disease. "[T]he law is clear that injunctions against 
carrying on legitimate business should go no further than is ab-
solutely necessary to protect the lawful rights of the parties 
seeking such injunction. "71 
III. A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN SEXUAL 
INTIMACY 
If the threshold correlation can be shown between sexual in-
tercourse in the bathhouse and the spread of AIDS, to what ex-
tent can the government regulate the sexual practices of bath-
house patrons for the purposes of stopping its spread?72 The 
answer depends on the classification of the activity for purposes 
of constitutional analysis. .. 
The United States Constitution's right of privacy is founded 
in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights and is applied to the 
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
67. Morton v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 2d at 583, 269 P.2d at 86. 
68. A per se nuisance is one in which its operation is always unlawful, no matter 
how operated (e.g., a building with numerous code violations which threatens the health 
and safety of the community). See People v. Wheeler, 30 Cal. App. 3d 282, 106 Cal. Rptr. 
260 (1973). 
69. See Fresno v. Fresno Canal and Irrigation Co., 98 Cal. 179, 183-84, 32 P. 943, 
945 (1893); Byers v. Colonial Irrigation Co., 134 Cal. 553, 555, 66 P. 732, 733 (1901); 
McPheeters v. McMahon, 131 Cal. App. 418, 425; 21 P.2d 606, 609 (1933); Morton v. 
Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 2d at 582, 269 P.2d at 85; Enos v. Harmon, 157 Cal. App. 
2d 746, 750, 321 P.2d 810, 813 (1958); People v. Mason, 124 Cal. App. 3d 348, 354, 177 
Cal. Rptr. 284, 288 (1981). 
70. See infra note 72. 
71. People v. Mason, 124 Cal. App. 3d at 354, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 288. 
72. The author makes an assumption in this Comment that gay bathhouses are legal 
in most major metropolitan centers where adult consensual same-sex sexual conduct is 
not criminal, and the basis for restricting the activities which go on inside will be to stop 
the spread of AIDS. Other bases, besides health protection, such as welfare and morals, 
could also be argued by states where such conduct is criminalized. The author leaves 
criticism of these bases to other writers. 
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ment.73 It is a fundamental right of the individuaF4 which the 
Supreme Court has extended to decisions relating to marriage,711 
procreation,76 contraception,77 family relationships,78 childrear-
ing,79 and abortion.80 The Court in Doe u. Commonwealth's At-
torney summarily affirmed that there is no fundamental right to 
privacy in homosexual intercourse,81 but in a later case men-
73. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965), the right to privacy is 
drawn from the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, including the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 9th 
and 14th amendments. Id. at 484-85. The right may also "emanate from the totality of 
the constitutional scheme under which we live," Id. at 494. (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
74. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 152-53 (1973). 
75. Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967). 
76. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942). 
77. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972). 
78. Prince v. Mass., 312 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
79. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). 
80. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). 
81. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) 
(summary affirmance of 403 F.Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975)). The district court in Doe 
rejected the constitutional challenge of a Virginia sodomy statute criminalizing adult 
consensual same sex sexual activity. Without briefs or oral argument, the Supreme Court 
summarily affirmed the district court's decision by a 6 to 3 vote (Marshall, Brennan and 
Stevens, JJ., dissenting). 
The reasoning the lower court had used to hold that the statute did not "offend the 
Bill of Rights or any other Amendments," Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1199, is flawed. Using a 
minimal rational basis test, the state never had to show its claim that homosexuality 
actually caused moral delinquency, but only that it was "likely to end in a contribution 
to moral delinquency." Judge Bryan based his finding that there was no fundamental 
right on gratuitous Supreme Court dicta by Justices Goldberg and Harlan, in previous 
minority opinions. Id. at 1201-02. 
Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intima-
cies which the State forbids . ... " Id. at 1201 (citing Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring)). "I would not suggest that adultery homosexuality, 
fornication and incest are immune from criminal inquiry, 
however privately practiced." Id. at 1201 (citing Poe v. Ull-
man, 367 U.S. 497, 552-53 (1961) (Harlan, 'J., dissenting)). 
"The laws regarding marriage which provide both when the 
sexual powers may be used and legal societal context in which 
children are born and brought up, as well as laws forbidding 
adultery, fornication, and homosexual practices which express 
the negative of the proposition, confining sexuality to lawful 
marriage, form a pattern so deeply pressed into the substance 
of our social life that any Constitutional doctrine in this area 
must build upon that basis. 
Id. at 1201-02 (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting)),' 
Bryan ignored Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 454-55, which expanded the privacy 
right beyond the limits of the marital bedroom. In support of the statute he cited Lovisi 
v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), a case involving exposure of heterosexual 
15
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tioned that the issue of privacy in consensual sexual activity had 
not yet been settled.82 Although courts have followed the Su-
preme Court's affirmance in Doe, some courts view the question 
as unsettled.83 Because of the unsettled state of the law and the 
lack of a written Supreme Court opinion on the issue of adult 
consensual same-sex sexual intercourse, reexamination of the 
right to privacy issues involved is justified. 
Many of the privacy cases concern decisions arIsmg from 
sexual relations. The right to privacy in sexual relations has 
been found in the decisions to bear and beget children,84 and 
whether to use' contraception or have an abortion.811 These deci-
sions are different sides of the same coin. The decision to procre-
ate involves a decision in each act of sexual intercourse whether 
contraception will be used, and if conception occurs, whether an 
abortion will be undertaken. Implicit in the decision to use con-
sex acts to children, and having no analogy to private adult consensual same-sex sexual 
intercourse. Id. at 1202. 
As a summary affirmance, the precedential value is limited. No Supreme Court Jus-
tice has written an opinion on the issue. No more can be read into it than was necessary 
to decide the precise issues before the Court. Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 784-
85 n.5 (1983). Professor Tribe argues that the precise issue for the Court's summary 
affirmance may not have been the merits of the claim, but a justiciability issue. He ar-
gues plaintiffs brought the suit as a facial challenge and were apparently never 
threatened with prosecution under the statute. The Court may have affirmed on the ba-
sis that the case was not ripe, and that an affirmance instead of an order to vacate the 
judgment is consistent with denying relief to plaintiffs on jurisdictional grounds. L. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 943 (1978). Notwithstanding Tribe's strained ar-
gument, judges have cited Doe as controlling precedent in privacy cases regarding adult 
consensual same-sex sexual intercourse. See Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 
1976); De Santis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Inc., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979); Gaylord v. 
Tacoma School Dist., 559 P.2d 1340, 1340 (Wash. 1977); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 
778, 809 (9th Cir. 1980); Matlovich v. Secretary of Air Force, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 
1978) (issue not reached). 
82. "The Court has not definitely answered the difficult question whether and to 
what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private consensual sex-
ual] behavior among adults .... " Carey v. Population Servo Int'I., 431 U.S. 678, 689 n.5 
(1977). Since Carey was a case concerning contraception, the unanswered question may 
only be with regards to heterosexual private consensual sexual behavior. 
83. New York V. Onofre, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 566 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1980); Beller V. 
Middendorf, 632 F.2d at 810; Baker V. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982). 
84. See Skinner V. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (forced sterilization of felons held 
unconstitutional). 
85. See Griswold V. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy in the use of 
contraceptives in marital sexual intercourse); Eisenstadt V. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
(right to privacy in use of contraceptives for non-marital sexual intercourse); Roe V. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to privacy protects the decision between a woman and 
her doctor whether to have an abortion in the first trimester of pregnancy). 
16
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traception is the decision to engage in sexual intercourse.86 
The Supreme Court has retained the artificial dichotomy 
between decisions to have sexual intercourse and decisions 
whether to bear and beget children, protecting the latter,87 yet 
not reaching an answer to the former.88 Heterosexual women 
would not see a distinction between the right to decide to have 
sexual intercourse and the right to decide to use contraception 
or have an abortion. For the woman, the decision to have sex is, 
in every instance, a decision whether to bear and beget children. 
There is no meaningful distinction between the two. From the 
vantage point of the potentially pregnant woman, both decisions 
should have fundamental right status. 
The idea of privacy protection over choices fundamentally 
affecting the person was further stressed in Roe v. Wade. 89 The 
fundamental nature of the decision to have an abortion was il-
lustrated by emphasizing the detrimental i.mpact that denying 
the choice would have on the woman: 
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force 
upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psy-
chological harm may be imminent. Mental and 
physical health may be taxed by child care. There 
is also the distress, for all concerned, associated 
with the unwanted child, and there is the problem 
of bringing a child into a family already unable, 
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In 
other cases, as in this one, the additional difficul-
ties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood 
may be involved.90 
Similarly, denial of sexual preference may be distressful for 
86. One court described the privacy right in sexual relations as follows: "It is not the 
marriage vows which make intimate and highly personal the sexual behavior of human 
beings. It is, instead, the nature of sexuality itself or something intensely private to the 
individual that calls for constitutional protection." Lovisi v. Slayton, 363 F. Supp. 620, 
625 (E.D. Va. 1973), rev'd, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976). 
87. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 454-55. "If the right of privacy means anything, 
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as to the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child." [d. 
88. Carey, 431 U.S. at 689. 
89. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
90. [d. at 153. 
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the lesbian or gay man. Much study has been devoted to the 
psychological aspects of homosexuality. The American Psychiat-
ric Association no longer considers homosexuality a disease or 
disorder, but rather an alternative expression of sexuality.91 So-
cial and legal biases against adult consensual same-sex sexual 
activity create pressures on the individual to repress homosexual 
desires. 
Implicit in the denial of the right to choose sexual prefer-
ence is a moral or psychological judgment that the activity is 
wrong. This leaves the homosexual the choice of either re-
pressing his/her feelings or renouncing his/her homosexuality, 
thereby being "saved" or "cured." Repression can lead to emo-
tional and psychological harm, and attempts to cure what is not 
a disease have proved ludicrous and harmfu1.92 
Homosexuals who have not yet "come out"93 often feel 
shame, guilt and loneliness because of social judgments con-
demning homosexuality: 
To grow up in a family where the word 'homosex-
ual' was whispered, to play in a playground and 
hear the words 'faggot' and 'queer,' to go to 
church and hear of 'sin' and then to college and 
hear of 'illness,' and finally to the counseling 
center that promises to 'cure' is hardly an envi-
ronment of freedom and voluntary choice.94 
An environment of freedom of choice for the homosexual 
has been shown to liberate the person of guilt and shame.91i The 
protection that inclusion of same-sex sexual intercourse within 
privacy would afford the "choice" to be homosexual would un-
91. 9 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 1 (Jan. 2. 1974). 
92. Gonsiorek. Social Psychological Concepts in the Understanding of Homosexu-
ality. HOMOSEXUALITY 118 (1982). Morality as a basis for denying adult same-sex sexual 
privacy is too large a topic to deal with in this Comment. 
93. "Coming out" has been defined as the self-admission and acceptance of ones 
homosexuality and the communication to others of the fact. Coleman. Developmental 
States of the Coming Out Process. HOMOSEXUALITY 151 (~.982). 
94. Davidson. Politics. Ethics and Therapy for Homosexuality. HOMOSEXUALITY 94 
(1982). 
95. Coleman. Developmental Stages of Coming Out Process. HOMOSEXUALITY. 150. 
(citing Silverstein. Behavior Modification and the Gay Community. (Oct. 1972) paper 
presented to the Association for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy. Annual 
Convention). 
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doubtedly reduce the shame, guilt and maladjustment which re-
sults from stigmatization. 
Fundamental right status should be extended to adult con-
sensual same-sex sexual intercourse as well. A homosexual's de-
cision whether to follow his or her sexual orientation is a basic 
decision in his or her life. The choice to engage in adult consen-
sual same-sex sexual intercourse is essential to the self-determi-
nation of the individual over matters of intimate concern and 
great importance. It is basic to significant intimate relations, 
family relations, friends and associations. The liberty to make 
this intimate decision has a similar impact on homosexuals as do 
the decisions to marry, procreate or not to have children impact 
on heterosexuals. 
The California right to privacy96 also protects an area of in-
timacy in personal relations. This fundamental right extends its 
protections to the home, family, thought, emotions and expres-
sions, personality, and freedom of communion and association.9? 
It protects the "right to be left alone."98 The California Supreme 
Court has included "sex" within the right to privacy. 99 
Private adult consensual same-sex sexual intercourse should 
be protected by right. Homoeroticism is an innate and intimate 
aspect of a homosexual's personality, emotions and expressions. 
Central to any sexual experience is the intimate rapport and 
sharing protected by the freedom of communion. In many in-
stances, the lesbian or gay relationship is the center of the 
couple's family and home life. . 
On equal protection grounds, a strong argument can be 
made that the denial of fundamental privacy right status for 
adult consensual same-sex sexual intercourse results in differen-
tial treatment between heterosexuals and homosexuals. State 
96. "All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable righta. 
Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and pro-
tecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. 
CONST. art. I § 1 (emphasis added). 
97. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d, 757, 774, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 105, 533 P.2d 222, 233 
(1975). 
98.Id. 
99. People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359, 458 P.2d 194, 199 
(1969). 
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sodomy statutes either explicitly or implicitly treat homosexuals 
differently than heterosexuals. Either their terms are limited to 
same-sex sexual conduct or are discriminatory in effect by for-
bidding anal and oral intercourse (the primary method of sexual 
intercourse for homosexuals). Statutes which forbid adult con-
sensual same-sex sexual intercourse but not adult consensual 
heterosexual intercourse treat homosexuals differently. A deter-
mination of fundamental right status for adult consensual heter-
osexual sexual intercourseloo but not same-sex sexual intercourse 
would be a denial of equal protection of a fundamental right and 
challenges to sodomy statutes would be entitled to strict scru-
tiny.lol However, the U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized a 
fundamental right to adult consensual heterosexual sexual inter-
course. Therefore, the government need only show a rational ba-
sis why adult consensual same-sex sexual intercourse should be 
restricted. Because the California Constitution recognizes heter-
osexual sex as a protected privacy right, California courts would 
apply strict scrutiny. 
A. A Rational Basis to Restrict Same-Sex Sexual 
Intercourse 
The present state of federal law appears to afford no funda-
mental right to privacy in adult consensual same-sex sexual ac-
tivity although this is not well settled.lo2 Restrictions on this ac-
tivity to prevent the spread of AIDS are limited only in that 
they be reasonably based and not arbitrary. The rational basis 
test would be met by a minimal showing that bathhouse patrons 
engage in sexual activity which is likely to spread AIDS, and 
that closing them (or restricting the types of sexual activity to 
those acts not likely to transmit the AIDS agent) is a reasonable 
means to stop its spread. 
The state has a similar case under an equal protection chal-
lenge because the classification of gay men as a group to be de-
nied sexual intercourse can be rationally supported by evidence 
that AIDS is spread by anal and oral sexual intercourse and that 
it has so far been limited almost entirely to the four risk groups 
100. See supra notes 73-99 and accompanying text. 
101. San Antonio School District v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. I, 17 (1973). 
102. See supra notes 81, 82 and accompanying text. 
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in which gay men constitute the large majority. lOS 
Bathhouse proprietors and some gay attorneys have framed 
counter-arguments to this basis of rationality. Closing bath-
houses is not a rational response to the state's interest in 
preventing the spread of AIDS if it can be shown that bath-
houses are safer places to have sexual intercourse than other en-
vironments. They claim that closings will only change the loca-
tion of the dangerous behavior, not the behavior itself, and that 
bathhouses have bathing facilities, educational programs, and 
condom distribution which make the sexual activity safer. They 
also claim that a rise in public sexual activity in unclean parks 
and restrooms has occurred since the baths have become unpop-
ular. In sum, the counter-argument is that the closing of the 
bathhouses will do nothing to stop the spread of the disease. l04 
On the other hand, the truism that closing the bathhouses 
only restricts the place where the acts occur, not the act itself, is 
misleading. The state's interest is clearly to limit the spread of 
the disease by limiting, where it has the power, dangerous sexual 
activity in the gay population. By closing the bathhouses it is 
limiting the opportunity to engage in sexual activity, and may 
do the same in parks or restrooms if it can prove that the danger 
of AIDS spreading occurs in those places as well. The state need 
only proceed one step at a time towards its goal. Therefore, 
under a rational basis standard, a court would uphold limiting 
the sexual activity which can be shown to spread AIDS. 
The consequence of a rational basis standard for sexual pri-
vacy extends to other gay rights areas as well. Logical connec-
tions between legitimate state interests and statutes which dif-
ferentially treat homosexuals and subject them to discriminatory 
burdens appear more anacronistic, irrational and poorly articu-
lated in light of the growth of lesbian and gay liberation move-
ments. To be sure, courts have proved a barrier to the develop-
ment of gay rights. 1011 But the threat of AIDS presents a new 
103. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
104. Kohorn. Achtenberg. Hitchens. Coles. Steel. and McShane. Draft Preliminary 
Report: AIDS and the Regulation of Bathhouses at 8 (Aug. 9. 1984) (submitted to the 
Public Protection Committee. Board of Supervisors. City and County of San Francisco) 
[hereinafter cited as AIDS and the Regulation of Bathhouses). 
105. See Rivera. Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual 
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basis for state action limiting gay sexual privacy in the bath-
house and bedroom, for discrimination in the workplace, public 
benefits, and government and military service. Furnished with a 
rational basis for the criminalization of gay sex, sodomy laws 
could continue to impose legal disabilities on lesbians and gay 
men through justifying discrimination against a "criminal" class. 
The nature of the privacy interest involved is highly inti-
mate; the bases of decision making concern innate emotional 
and psychological characteristics in the individual; the denial of 
the choice fundamentally impacts the individual's sexual and fa-
milial expressions as well as social relationships; and the legal 
consequences from a denial of privacy protection results in disa-
bilities which could extend far beyond the bedroom or bath-
house. Under the Federal and California Constitutions, the frag-
ile character and intensity of the privacy value at stake106 
justifies a stricter level of scrutiny than the rational basis test 
affords. 
B. Applicability of Strict Scrutiny 
In applying a higher level of scrutiny, a fundamental right 
can be infringed upon only by an important107 or compelling108 
public interest. The state's interest in preventing the spread of 
AIDS is a compelling interest. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has held on two separate occasions 
that the state's interest in preventing the spread of communica-
ble diseases outweighs the individual's interest in free exercise of 
Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 814 (Federal Civil Service employ-
ees), 831 (security clearances), 837, 854-55 (armed forces personnel), 860 (licenses), 860-
74 (public school teachers), 874, 878 (marriage), 883 (divorce); but contra 924 (universi-
ties and other public forums) (1979). 
106. "[Olne might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general and the Due Process 
Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable 
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize 
praiseworthy government officials .... " Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). 
Professor Tribe describes the need for stricter judicial scrutiny in cases where the rights 
involved are "politically fragile," i.e., highly susceptible to emasculation in the particular 
case. The "character and intensity" of the right in a particular case determine its politi-
cal resilience. L. TRIBE, supra note 81, at 575. 
107. Middle-level scrutiny. Rostger v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981). 
108. Strict scrutiny. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973). 
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religion. 109 In more recent cases it has held that the state has a 
compelling interest in protecting viable fetal life,l1o and the 
health and safety of pregnant mothers.lll AIDS is a deadly com-
municable disease for which there is at present no cure. ll2 The 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has made it a 
top priority concern.11S Thousands have died, and the death toll 
rises at a logarithmic rate. 114 Stopping its spread is an interest 
which follows the line of compelling health and safety interests 
found in the abortion and communicable disease cases. The na-
ture of the threat may be so compelling that most courts would 
find that closing bathhouses would withstand any degree of 
scrutiny. 
Strict scrutiny is the most appropriate standard of review. 
It allows for the assertion of the compelling state interest while 
recognizing the intimate privacy interests of the gay man. It pro-
vides for the repression of dangerous sexual intercourse when 
necessary, while allowing safe sexual intercoursem to continue. 
The number of bathhouses in anyone locality is small enough 
that state or local regulation could be accomplished with relative 
ease, limiting the necessity for the usual broad tolerance of over-
inclusiveness.118 The state would also have to show that regulat-
ing bathhouse sexual intercourse is necessary to limit the spread 
of AIDS, and that it is as or more likely to spread there than in 
other areas. Closing those establishments without this proof may 
give the public a false sense of security that the problem has 
been corrected when in fact it has not. 
109. Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905) "a community has the right to protect 
itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members." [d. at 
27. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) ("The right to practice religion freely 
does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable disease 
or the latter to ill health or death."). 
110. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (compelling point is at viability). 
111. [d. (compelling point is approximately at the end of the first trimester). 
112. See supra notes 3, 4 and accompanying text. 
113. Brandt, The Concentric Effects of AIDS, 99 PUB. HEALTH REP. I, 1 (1984). 
114. Selik, Haverkos and Curran, supra note I, at 494. 
115. "Safe sex" is sexual intercourse which does not involve the exchange of bodily 
fluids which may carry the AIDS agent. Safe sex practices include mutual masturbation, 
anal intercourse with a condom, and "fisting" (inserting the hand in the anus). Danger-
ous sex includes oral-genital and oral-anal ("rimming"), and anal intercourse without a 
condom. 
116. L. TRIBE, supra note 81, at 999. 
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Proof of the necessity of limiting the type of sexual conduct 
in bathhouses in order to stop the spread of AIDS is crucial in 
placing boundaries on an order limiting a certain type of sexual 
conduct. The extension of such a limitation to other environ-
ments, such as the bedroom, by only showing that it is rational, 
but not necessary, to prevent the spread of AIDS, poses a 
greater danger to gay sexual privacy rights than the closing of 
fourteen sex establishments. If the state can show that it is the 
nature of bathhouse sex, its mUltiple and anonymous sex con-
tacts, which poses the threat of spread, then by comparison, gay 
sexual activity in one's bedroom is safer because it lacks these 
factors. The result could be an order which only limits proven 
dangerous sexual conduct and restricts its consequence to the 
bathhouse environment. 
Closing bathhouses is an overbroad action which invades 
the privacy of patrons engaging in safe sex. A less burdensome 
alternative would be forbidding dangerous sexual intercourse 
which could spread an AIDS agent. Coupled with condom distri-
bution and education on safe sexual practices, this alternative 
protects the public from the spread of the disease while allowing 
the private conduct to continue in a limited way. 
V. ENFORCEMENT 
Documentation of unsafe sexual intercourse in bathhouses 
for the purpose of either enforcing a ban on unsafe intercourse 
or to gather evidence for the closing of establishments where it 
occurs raises fourth amendment search and seizure issues. Bath-
houses are public businesses in that the general public may use 
them. However, a significant amount of sexual activity occurs 
behind closed doors in private rooms which are rented by the 
patrons. Unsafe sexual intercourse which occurs in the common 
areas would be in plain view of government officers,117 and would 
have no justifiable expectation of privacy. Therefore, observa-
tion of the activity would not be a "search" subject to fourth 
117. Whether the inspection is done by police officers or by Health Department of-
ficers, the government is still limited by the strictures of the fourteenth amendment. 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (overruling Frank v. Maryland, 359 
U.S. 360 (1959) which exempted quarantine searches from fourth amendment require-
ments); Parish v. Civil Servo Comm'n., 66 Cal. 2d 260, 262-63, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623, 628, 425 
P.2d 223, 228 (1967). 
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amendment limitations.H8 Activity behind closed doors in 
rented rooms occurs with a justifiable expectation of privacy 
which can only be invaded by a reasonable inspection based on 
probable cause.H9 
A series of cases involving adult consensual same-sex sexual 
activity in toilet stalls in California public restrooms sheds light 
on the nature of a reasonable search in a bathhouse environ-
ment. The privacy protection afforded toilet stalls in these cases 
is analogous to the privacy protections which should be afforded 
cubicles in bathhouses. Toilet stalls and cubicles are both en-
closed areas within public places. The expectation of privacy af-
forded rented cubicles is at least as high as a toilet stall in a 
public restroom. The toilet stall cases originally took two differ-
ent tacks: the Bielicki-Britt l20 line of cases held unconstitutional 
all clandestine surveillancel2l of public restrooms without proba-
ble cause that the specific individuals inside were going to com-
mit sex acts;122 the Smayda123 line of cases held that where the 
acts were committed in an area of the restroom where the officer 
could see them if he were present in the room, then there was no 
justifiable expectation of privacy to protect, and no search sub-
ject to fourth amendment strictures. 124 
118. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
119. California courts have required probable cause before the state may restrict the 
individual pursuant to its quarantine powers, see supra note 53 and accompanying text, 
and in searches of public restrooms by police enforcing penal statutes against public sex 
acts, infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text. 
120. Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552, 371 P.2d 288 
(1962); Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849, 374 P.2d 817 (1962). 
121. Clandestine surveillance was that done by officers hidden from view of the rest-
room patrons, e.g., behind a wall or in a closet. 
122. Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 605, 21 Cal. Rptr. 552, 553, 371 P.2d 
288, 289 (1962) ("there would appear to be no doubt ... that the acts of Officer Hetzel 
constituted a 'search' .... "); Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 472, 24 Cal. Rptr. 
849,851,374 P.2d 817, 819 (1962) ("The crucial fact ... [was] the manner in which the 
police observed a place - and persons in that place - which is ordinarily understood to 
afford personal privacy to individual occupants."); People v. Metcalf, 22 Cal. App. 3d 20, 
23,98 Cal. Rptr. 925, 927 (1971) ("We believe that the enactment of section 653n enunci-
ates a public policy against clandestine observation of public restrooms and renders it 
reasonable for users thereof to expect their privacy will not be surreptitiously violated."). 
123. Smayda v. U.S., 352 F.2d 251 (1965). 
124. [d. at 255. ("By using a public place appellants risked observation, and they 
have no constitutional right to demand that such observation be made only by one whom 
they could see."); People v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d 173, 174, 25 Cal. Rptr. 676, 678 
(1962) ("Their activities were not, as in Bielicki, such that no other member of the pub-
lic could have seen them."); People v. Young, 214 Cal. App. 2d 131, 135, 29 Cal. Rptr. 
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People v. Triggs resolved the conflict among the cases by 
affirming the Bielicki-Britt line of cases. Clandestine surveil-
lance constituting a general search without probable cause vio-
lates the fourth amendment and Article I, § 19 of the California 
Constitution, whether or not the activity could have been viewed 
from inside the restroom.121i Any clandestine observation of ac-
tivities inside bathhouses without probable cause would be un-
constitutional, even if the activity could have been viewed by the 
officer if he were in a common area of the bathhouse.126 
Clandestine surveillance would require the cooperation of 
bathhouse proprietors who, given the consequences of discovery 
of unsafe sexual intercourse, would not likely acquiesce. The 
more likely method of enforcement would be sending undercover 
agents into the bathhouses as patrons. Without probable cause 
those agents could only observe activity in plain view of common 
areas, and not within closed rooms unless invited inside. A 
"[m]an's constitutionally protected right of personal privacy not 
only abides with him while he is the householder ... but cloaks 
him when as a member of the public he is temporarily occupying 
a room - including a toilet stall - to the extent that it is of-
fered to the public for private ... use.127 Under the probable 
cause standard used in the toilet stall cases, in order to justify 
entry, it would be difficult for the state to show sufficient facts 
that unsafe sex was probable in a closed cubicle. 
Another method for determining the level of cause required 
to conduct a reasonable bathhouse search is to use the balancing 
approach articulated in Camara v. Municipal Court.l2S The like-
lihood of achieving the state's goals in preventing the spread of 
AIDS via "unsafe" sexual conduct is weighed against the privacy 
invasion to the individual.129 In Camara the Court determined 
492, 494 (1963) (UMerely to observe what is perfectly apparent to any member of the 
general public who might happen to be on the premises is not a search.") (quoting Peo-
ple v. Norton, 209 Cal. App. 2d at 176-77, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 678 (1962». 
125. People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 891-92, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408, 412-13, 506 P.2d 
232, 236-37 (1973). 
126. It might, however, be argued that the very act of rental of such a private room 
in a bathhouse constitutes probable cause. 
127. Britt, 58 Cal. 2d at 472, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 851. 
128. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
129. [d. at 535-37. U[T]here can be no ready test for determining reasonableness 
other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search en-
tails." [d. at 536-37. U[R]easonableness is still the ultimate standard. If a valid public 
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that routine housing code inspections were reasonable when ini-
tiated pursuant to a warrant, even without the traditional prob-
able cause requirement of specific knowledge of the conditions 
inside the particular dwelling.I30 Three factors were stressed in 
coming to this conclusion: (1) a history of acceptance and acqui-
escence to the inspections, a fact not present in the bathhouse 
setting; (2) the public interest in abating dangerous conditions 
and the inability or any other canvassing technique to achieve 
acceptable results; and (3) the limited invasion of housing in-
spections on personal privacy.I31 
For searches into private rooms to be effective in discover-
ing "unsafe" sexual conduct, unannounced entry would seem to 
be required. No other canvassing technique would be as effec-
tive. But as long as there are private rooms in which to have sex, 
no canvassing technique will be very effective. 
The nature of the search involved in bathhouses is very per-
sonal and frequent. 132 The intrusion into sexual privacy weighs 
heavily in favor of a more stringent reasonableness requirement 
than that required for housing code searches. Although the 
countervailing state of interest is very strong, it is not demon-
strably stronger than its interest in safe housing articulated in 
Camara. Random searches not based on articulable facts intrude 
on the privacy of patrons who pose no danger of spreading 
AIDS, as well as the privacy of those who do. The frequency and 
personal nature of random bathhouse cubicle searches not based 
on articulable facts, and the lack of historical acceptance of the 
practice, imposes too great an intrusion on privacy to justify the 
state's goal of preventing the spread of the disease by methods 
of questionable effectiveness. Under the Camara test, a more 
stringent reasonableness requirement, based on specific facts of 
suspected unsafe sexI33 should be required. A reasonabl~ suspi-
interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause to issue a suit-
ably restricted search warrant." [d. at 539. 
130. [d. at 538, 
131. [d. at 537. 
132. Employees must patrol every 20 minutes in San Francisco v. Owen. See supra 
note 41. 
133. The fact of entering a private room alone should not be used to establish rea-
sonable suspicion. To deduce reasonable suspicion from an individual's exercise of his 
legitimate privacy right without more creates a vacuous reasonableness requirement. An 
act creating a reasonable suspicion is required. 
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cion standard achieves the appropriate balance. 
In San Francisco v. Owen,134 the court faced the issue of a 
fourth amendment right to privacy in the rented rooms of a 
bathhouse. Its response was to order the doors removed from all 
private rooms available to patrons, turning them into common 
areas which can be patroled by employees. l3CI Since the order 
was part of a preliminary injunction issued without opinion, 
there is no clue as to what authority the court used to base its 
decision. It appears that the court erred in ordering removal of 
the doors. 
The court has eliminated the fourth amendment protections 
of the patrons by forbidding their privacy expectations. The 
fourth amendment applies only when the individual has a justi-
fiable expectation of privacy.136 The state may not avoid the 
strictures of the amendment by ordering the elimination of the 
environment which creates the expectation of privacy. To do so 
emasculates the amendment and deprives itlof all meaning. The 
private rooms are rented by the patrons specifically for the pur-
pose of affording themselves a private environment under their 
own control.137 If a person has a protected privacy expectation in 
the toilet stall of a public restroom,138 he should have it in a 
rented room in a bathhouse. The court's decision to remove that 
134. No. 830-321 (Cal. Super. Ct., S.F. Cal. Nov. 28, 1984) (order granting prelimi-
nary injunction). 
135. See supra note 41. 
136. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. at 353. 
137. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 149 (1978); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 
105 (1980). 
Jones not only had permission to use the apartment of his 
friend, but had a key to the apartment with which he admit-
ted himself on the day of the search and kept possessions in 
the apartment. Except with respect to his friend, Jones had 
complete dominion and control over the apartment and could 
exclude others from it. Likewise in Katz, the defendant occu-
pied the telephone booth, shut the door behind him to exclude 
all others and paid the toll, which "entitled [him] to assume 
the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece [would] not be 
broadcast to the world." (389 U. S. at 352). Katz and Jones 
could legitimately expect privacy in the areas which were the 
subject of the search and seizure each sought to contest. 
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149. "Nor did petitioner have any right to exclude other persons from 
access to Cox's purse." Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. at 105. 
138. Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 472, 24 Cal. Rptr. 849, 851, 374 P.2d 
817, 819. 
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expectation of privacy and thereby avoid the reasonableness re-
quirement of the fourth amendment is unconstitutional. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is a direct conflict between the right to privacy for 
gay sexual intercourse and the need to protect the public health 
from the spread of AIDS. This conflict is not unresolvable. The 
goals of the gay man and the public are not antagonistic, and a 
sensitive balancing of the competing interests involved could re-
sult in a solution benefiting everyone. 
Given the traditionally strong position of the state when it 
asserts interests in protecting the spread of communicable dis-
ease and the weak position of adult consensual same-sex sexual 
intercourse among the field of privacy rights, courts will likely 
uphold statutes restricting gay sex in bathhouses. But deference 
to state orders restricting sexual intercourse will not result in a 
solution to the problem. The evidence that AIDS spreads more 
rapidly in bathhouses than in other environments is inconclu-
sive. Closing them or limiting the sexual activity inside without 
proof of the danger they pose may give the public, gay and 
straight, a false sense that the problem has been solved, if in fact 
it has not. Deferential treatment under a rational basis standard 
of scrutiny could result in further restrictions on gay rights in 
other areas of the law, or an effort to recriminalize sodomy. Ef-
forts to stop the spread of AIDS should not be a sledgehammer 
to gay rights. The character of sexual intimacy underlying much 
of the right of privacy is important and should be afforded pro-
tection as a fundamental right. 
Review under strict scrutiny would allow the state to assert 
its compelling interest in stopping the spread of AIDS while pro-
tecting the sexual privacy interests of the gay man. It would al-
low intrusions on· that interest only when they were necessary 
and accomplished in the least restrictive manner. It should pre-
vent the use of a bathhouse sex limitation as precedent for fur-
ther restrictions on gay sexual activity. 
Enforcement of any limitation on sexual activity within 
bathhouses must be achieved through constitutional means. The 
penumbras of privacy surround the fourth amendment as well. 
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To ignore its strictures while treating sexual privacy as a funda-
mental right creates no more than a paper right without 
protection. 
The courts must be sensitive to the impact this conflict has 
on the gay community. They need to avoid compounding the 
hysteria, hatred and defensiveness which surrounds the issue. A 
deeper awareness of the privacy issues involved will help courts 
fashion remedies which are effective and necessary, not overly 
intrusive or motivated by bias. 
Stephen Collier* 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1986. 
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